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I. INTRODUCTION
In the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
case Prosecutor v. Musema, the trial chamber held that an
individual can be found guilty solely for the crime of conspiracy to
commit genocide even if no genocide takes place.1 The trial
chamber found its jurisdiction to punish the crime of conspiracy
under its establishing statute, but looks almost exclusively at
national legal traditions to determine its content.2 It cites no other
international law supporting its decision to incorporate domestic
concepts into the crime. In contrast, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, which relatively recently entered into
*

B.A., Philosophy and Political Science, University of Southern California,
2006; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2010; LL.M., International and Comparative
Law, Cornell Law School, 2010. I am grateful to Professor Jens Ohlin for his
guidance and encouragement, and James Clegg for helping me flesh out my
ideas. Of course I am eternally grateful for my wife who put up with me as I
completed this piece. Thank you.
1
Prosecutor v. Musema, TJ, ¶194.
2
See Id. at ¶¶ 186-191, 196-198, & 939.
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force, seems to have intentionally dropped the crime of conspiracy
to commit genocide from its list of crimes under its jurisdiction.3
This legal and conceptual discord raises the question of whether
conspiracy is actually a legitimate substantive international crime,
and whether tribunals should continue to apply it.
Confusion over the status of conspiracy in international
criminal law may stem from the interplay between jus ad bellum
and jus in bello. Conspiracy was most prominently addressed
during the Nuremburg Trials where it was paired with the crime of
aggression.4 The crime of aggression falls under jus ad bellum.
War crimes, like genocide and crimes against humanity, fall under
the category of jus in bello. However, the true issue threatening
the legitimacy of international criminal law is not the confusion of
what type of law conspiracy should fall under, but whether
conspiracy should be made a substantive crime at all. The
divergent views of the common law and civil law traditions are
evidence that there the crime is not universal and would be foreign
to apply one conception to the other. Not respecting this difference
would threaten the legitimacy of the entire program.
This paper will attempt to demonstrate that there is no firm
foundation in international criminal law to support conspiracy as a
substantive crime that can stand alone. In Part II, the problem
regarding conspiracy as a part of international criminal law will be
presented, particular through the ICTR cases of Musema and
Nahimana which will frame the analysis. Each of those cases
claimed that a substantive crime of conspiracy existed in
international law without much discussion of it source or content.
Next in Part III, a general outline of the concept of inchoate crimes
will be presented along with some general concepts that are at the
core of the theory of conspiracy. Most of the work in this
discussion will be done in Part IV where possible sources of a
substantive crime of conspiracy in international criminal law will
be searched for. Different sources of international criminal law
will be presented and possible sources of a substantive crime of
conspiracy will be highlighted. Finally, in Part V this paper will
analyze the most pertinent sources presented in Part IV and assess
whether a substantive crime of conspiracy actually exists and
whether such claims as those in the ICTR cases are valid. The
ultimate goal of this inquiry is to reveal and critique the muddled
and haphazard way that courts have applied legal principles to
international criminal law.

3
4

See infra Part IV(b)(iii).
See infra, Part IV(d)(i).
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II. PROBLEM: IS THERE A SUBSTANTIVE CRIME OF CONSPIRACY?
George Fletcher distinguishes three branches of law that are
associated with conspiracy—two of which have been accepted in
international law.5 The first branch he calls the “Nuremberg
version,” which holds that the collective planning, preparing,
initiating, and waging of aggressive war is a punishable offense
under international law.6 In the second branch he finds conspiracy
as a component of the complicity in the commission of a
substantive crime.7 These two branches of law, conspiracy as
related to the crime of aggression and as a mode of liability, have
been accepted in international criminal law.8 With the third branch
we get to the problem; the third branch is the substantive crime of
conspiracy as it is found the United States. Fletcher argues that
this branch of law has not been adopted in international law. The
status of the concept of conspiracy is unclear and was most
explicitly applied in the ICTR.
a. ICTR Cases
Alfred Musema, a director of a state-owned tea factory,
was alleged to have played a crucial role in the Rwandan genocide.
In Prosecutor v. Musema, an ICTR trial court held that conspiracy
to commit genocide should be defined as an agreement between a
group to commit genocide.9 The trial court found that the required
intent for the substantive crime of conspiracy to commit genocide
is the same intent required for the crime of genocide, namely the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical, racial or
religious group as such.10 The trial court states, “It emerges from
this definition that, as far as the crime of conspiracy to commit
genocide is concerned, it is, indeed, the act of conspiracy itself, in
other words, the process (“procédé”) of conspiracy, which is
punishable and not its result.”11 The trial chamber went on to state
that a crime of conspiracy to commit genocide can stand alone
even if no genocide took place.12 However, the tribunal noted that
if the genocide did occur, the individual could not be convicted of
5

George P. Fletcher, Amicus Curiae Brief Hamdan v. Rumsfeld at 7-9 (2006)
[hereinafter Fletcher Brief].
6
See infra Part V(d); Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 7-8.
7
See infra Part V(d); Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 8.
8
Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 7-8.
9
Musema, TJ, ¶ 191.
10
Id. at ¶192.
11
Id. at ¶ 193.
12
Id. at ¶ 194.
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both a conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide itself.13 The
defendant would simply be convicted of the crime of genocide and
punishment for conspiring would be consumed by the substantive
crime.
In coming to this conclusion, the Musema trial chamber
looked to the differences in civil and common law jurisdictions to
determine the content of the crime of conspiracy to commit
genocide.14 The court first appropriated the common law actus
reus elements for conspiracy.15 It then rejected the common law
principle that a defendant can be convicted of both conspiracy and
the substantive crime, in favor of the civil law tradition that once
the object crime is committed then there is no reason to punish the
defendant for his résolution criminelle or criminal intent.16 This
cherry picking of doctrines does not follow any rubric and is in
essence arbitrary.
They cite to no guiding principles in
international law to legitimize their adoption of various aspects of
domestic legal systems. In addition the charge of conspiracy is
supported by the same set of facts as the object crime of
genocide.17 Ultimately, the trial chamber found that the prosecutor
failed show sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit
genocide.18 It is arguable that the trial chamber’s real reason for
dismissing the conspiracy charge was because it had enough
evidence to convict Musema of the substantive crime of
genocide.19 This reasoning extends into another ICTR case that
looks to U.S. legal theory to determine the substance of the crime
of conspiracy.
In Nahimana and others, the ICTR trial court expanded on
the ideas touched on by the Musema court.20 Ferdinand Nahimana
was a co-founder of the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des
Mille Collines (RTLM). During the Rawandan genocide, the radio
station broadcast information and propaganda that was key in the
coordination and incitement of the killing of Tutsis. Nahimana
was convicted for not doing anything by using his influence to stop
the radio broadcasts.
In the trial court, Nahimana was found
guilty of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and
public incitement to commit genocide, complicity in genocide, and

13

Id. at ¶ 198.
Id.
15
Id. at ¶ 191.
16
Id. at ¶¶ 196-98.
17
Id. at ¶ 937.
18
Id. at ¶ 940.
19
Id. at ¶ 941; see also ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GÖRAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 183 (2008).
20
Nahimana and others, AJ, ¶ 1048.
14
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crimes against humanity, and he was sentenced to life
imprisonment.
The Appeals Chamber reversed the trial court’s conspiracy
conviction that was based on an inference of an agreement. It
reiterates the components of the crime of conspiracy to commit
genocide as consisting of the existence of an agreement between
individuals to commit genocide—actus reus, and the intent to
destroy in whole or in part national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such—mens rea.21 The court notes that an agreement can
be inferred from circumstantial evidence as long as a conspiracy to
commit genocide is the only reasonable inference that can be made
based on the evidence.22 “Concerted” and “coordinated” action of
a group can constitute circumstantial evidence.23 The Appeals
Chamber specifically looked to U.S. case law in determining
whether a tacit agreement satisfies the actus reus requirement.24
The appellate body found that a reasonable trier of fact could not
have found that, based on the evidence presented, an inference of
an agreement to commit conspiracy was the only reasonable
inference to be drawn.25 The ICTR has therefore held that
conspiracy to commit genocide is a substantive crime that stands
alone.26 This holding and the content of the holding seem to clash
with general principles of international criminal law.
III. INCHOATE CRIME THEORY AND CONSPIRACY
A substantive crime of conspiracy is considered to be an
inchoate crime. An inchoate crime is especially an incomplete
crime, i.e. a crime committed in the course of perpetrating or
planning another crime.27 This other, “failed” crime is called the
object crime of the conspiracy. The rationale behind criminalizing
inchoate crimes is the idea that the acts leading up to a crime were
steps taken in an effort to do something illegal, regardless of
whether the perpetrator was caught before the actual crime was
committed or not. The seemingly benign acts are not actually so
innocent. There is thus a hope that criminalizing the acts leading
up to a crime will have a deterrence effect on society as a whole.28

21

Id. at ¶ 894.
Id. at ¶ 896.
23
Id. at ¶ 897.
24
Id. at ¶ 898 (citing Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10 (1975)).
25
Id. at ¶ 912.
26
Musema, TJ, ¶ 194; Nahimana and others, AJ, ¶ 1044.
27
DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN, AND DAVID P. STEWART,
INTERNATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 188 (2010).
28
See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 693-94 (1975).
22
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Conspiracy is inherently a group crime requiring collective
action. The basis of the crime is the agreement by a group to
commit a crime.29 The mens rea element of the crimes requires
that each member of the conspiracy must have knowledge of the
facts making up the crime the group intends to commit and the
intent to carry out the plan.30 The crime is almost exclusively
found in common law legal systems. Civil law systems shy away
from these types of inchoate crimes.
IV. IF IT EXISTED, WHAT IS ITS SOURCE?
The sources of international law, and similarly international
criminal law, have been listed in Article 38 of the 1945 Statute of
the International Court of Justice. The list provides for four main
sources of international law: international custom; international
conventions and treaties; general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations; and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.”31 The
resolutions of international organizations like the Security Council
are also form a part of international law. Treaty law and
customary law are thought to be of equal validity in that new
custom can supersede old treaties, and new treaties can supersede
existing custom. In addition, both function as a source for the
other, e.g. treaty law can “codify” pre-existing custom or give rise
to new customary norms. An example of the interplay between
treaty law and custom is the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, which clarified and crystallized existing customary law.
When a treaty’s provisions are regarded as a part of customary law,
those provisions are generally applicable to non-parties to the
treaty. Here, this paper will explore the different sources of
international law for a foundation for a substantive crime of
conspiracy.
a. Customary International Law
Simply, customary international law is formed by
consistent state practice combined with opinio juris or a sense of
legal obligation that the consistent state practice is required. State
practice is found by looking to the practice of the international
community and assessing whether there is sufficient consistency,
although absolute uniformity is not necessary. The practices of the
states most likely to be affected are the most relevant. The
29

ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 227 (2d ed. 2008).
Id.
31
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (1946).
30
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relevant state practice must be carried out as being required by a
legal obligation.32 Evidence of a sense of legal obligation can be
found in the negative response by the international community to
deviations in state practice. The strongest form of international
law is a form of customary law called jus cogens. Jus cogens is a
preemptory norm that supersedes all other sources of international
law and binds all states regardless of objection.33 Most of the main
international crimes, e.g. crime of aggressive war, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, make up jus cogens, as well as
prohibitions on apartheid, slavery, and torture.
The most prominent source of international criminal law is
the law of war. The law of war pre-dates World War II and was
primarily made up of customary law. It has slowly been codified
by a series of conventions and treaties that crystallize is provisions.
There does not seem to be any custom in the international realm
for holding an individual liable for the substantive crime of
conspiracy. Individuals were not generally held liable under
international law until very recently; international law primarily
dealt with states. Thus, the customary law of war most likely did
not have any provision for conspiracy at the international criminal
level. Other sources that evidence customary law are United
Nations General Assembly Resolutions. These resolutions often
evidence opinio juris that can be coupled with state practice.
There is a resolution in particular that “codifies” the principles in
the Nuremberg trials, which is discussed below.34 The resolution
may evidence custom, but it is particularly narrow and may not
comport with state practice as between civil and common-law
countries.
b. Treaty Law
Treaty law serves as an explicit source of international law
and functions much like either a contract or legislation. Treaty law
is a major source of obligations and rights and is often the most
explicit and clear form of international law. There are a number of
treaty regimes and conventions that specifically deal with
international criminal law and the role of conspiracy within that
law. The following are a few of the most relevant treaty regimes
that address or might address the concept of conspiracy in
international law.
32

See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v
Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Netherlands) ICJ Reports 4 at 44
(1969).
33
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 art. 53
(1969).
34
See infra Part IV(d)(i).
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i. Laws of War
The laws of war are primarily composed of a number of
multi-lateral treaties. The two main treaties regimes are the
Geneva and the Hague Conventions.
The 1949 Geneva
Conventions do not refer to conspiracy as a crime in its
contemplation of having individual states enforcing the “grave
breaches” through domestic proceedings.35
Therefore, as
mentioned above the laws of war do not explicitly contain a
substantive crime.36
ii. Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention is the convention or treaty with
most prominent use of conspiracy as a substantive crime. The
Genocide Convention includes the charge of conspiracy as a direct
response to Nazis Germany’s actions against the Jewish
population. Article 3 of the Convention states:
The following acts shall be
punishable:
(a) Genocide;
(b) Conspiracy to commit
genocide;
(c) Direct and public
incitement
to
commit
genocide;
(d) Attempt to commit
genocide;
(e) Complicity in genocide.37
The Convention makes explicit the crime of conspiracy to
commit genocide and this explicit proclamation is a direct result of
the drafters’ abhorrence for genocide and desire to criminalize
even the planning a genocide. Many of the provision in the
Genocide Convention have become a part of customary law, and it
is possible that article 3 cited above has become a part of
customary law since it has been adopted in the statutes establishing
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
35

See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
(Aug. 12, 1949) art. 129-30, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention].
36
See infra Part IV(a).
37
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
(Dec. 9, 1948) art. 3 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Genocide Convention).
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(ICTY) and the ICTR—although it was not adopted in the
International Criminal Court (ICC).38
iii. Statutes Establishing the International Tribunals and
Courts
The various statutes that establish the ad hoc tribunals and
the International Criminal Court (ICC) are also a place to look for
the concept of conspiracy as a substantive crime. These statutes
were either created through Security Council resolutions or
through the multi-lateral treaty process, and are based on existing
international law.
The 1945 London Charter of the International Military
Tribunal is the statute that gives the Nuremberg tribunal
jurisdiction over various crimes that include a conspiracy
component. Article 6 of the London Charter provided the
jurisdiction of the tribunal and enumerated crimes against peace,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity as acts falling within the
jurisdiction of the court.39 Article 6 goes on to state: “Leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan.”40 The
purpose of this phrase was to allow the tribunal to reach back to
pre-war acts committed against German Jews in the years from
1933 to 1939.
This type of conspiracy principle was inserted by U.S.
lawyer Murray Bernays who thought that the entire Nazis party
should be treated as a gang of criminals who seized the
government in Germany and used the power of the state as a tool
to carry out their illegitimate ends. Both French and Russia
delegates at the London debates disagreed with the concept
because the civil law countries do not have a similar concept.
They were particularly abhorred by the fact that each individual
would be responsible for all acts committed by the group simply
through an agreement and nothing else. This extended form of
liability would mean that one lowly Nazis guard would be
responsible for millions of murders.
Later, both major ad hoc tribunals established in the 1990s
would have the crime of conspiracy incorporated into their
jurisdiction under the crime of genocide. The statutes establishing
these tribunals and courts include jurisdiction over violations of the
38

CASSESE supra note 29, at 228.
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279, 284, art. 6. [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]
40
Id.

39
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law of war. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia states that “conspiracy to commit genocide”
is a crime within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.41 The Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda provides for the same
exact crime42—both being derived from the Genocide
Convention.43 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone,
establishing a court to try individuals for war crimes who involved
in the Sierra Leone Civil War, provides that “[a] person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime
referred to in articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall be
individually responsible for the crime.”44 Crimes falling under that
court’s jurisdiction include crimes against humanity45 and
violations of the Geneva Conventions;46 however, the statute does
not provide for jurisdiction over the crime of genocide or
conspiracy to commit genocide explicitly.
The Rome Statute,47 which establishes the International
Criminal Court, adopted every part of the Genocide Convention,
except for the part regarding conspiracy.48 Article 6 of the Rome
Statute eliminates the conspiracy prong of the crime of genocide:
For the purpose of this
Statute, “genocide” means any of the
following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the
group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life
41

Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (May
25, 1993), art. 4(3)(b) 32 I.L.M. 1192 (ICTY Statute).
42
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Nov. 8, 1994), art.
2(3)(b) 33 I.L.M. 1598 (ICTR Statute).
43
See supra Part IV(b)(ii).
44
Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, (Jan. 16, 2002) art. 6(1) (SCLC
Statute).
45
Id. at art. 2.
46
Id. at art. 3.
47
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (July 17, 1998) 37 I.L.M.
999 (Rome Statute).
48
Antonio Cassese, Genocide in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 335, 347 (eds. Cassese, Gaeta & Jones,
2002).
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calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part;
(d)
Imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the
group;
(e)
Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another
group.49
This omission is likely a signal that the drafters did not
think it prudent to include conspiracy. The signal may be pointing
to the fact the drafters did and do not consider a substantive crime
of conspiracy as being a part of international criminal law. This
recent omission in the creation of a new legal regime raises the
issue to a new level.
c. General Principles of Law: Domestic Law
Courts can use general principles of law to fill gaps in
international law that will help make sense of the entire legal
schema. General principles of law carry less weighted and are
quite controversial in international law because of their uncertain
states. There is a strong preference for treaty and customary law
because they are thought to better capture the spirit of the law most
consented to by most nations. If international law, though treaties
or custom, fails to provide an appropriate standard or guide for a
court, then a court may look to the domestic legal systems for
guidance in determining appropriate standards. In the case of
international conspiracy, there has been much focus on the
domestic approaches to conspiracy, especially the differences
between the common and civil law traditions.
Many international courts and commentators look to the
United States’ legal system for guidance or a reference point. In
the United States, conspiracy is a substantive crime in addition to
being a mode of liability.50 The United States federal code in, 18
U.S.C. §371, provides for three basic elements for the crime of
conspiracy. There are other conspiracy statutes in the federal
code,51 but this one best outlines the main elements. These
elements include; an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective
49

Rome Statute, art 6.
See Allison M. Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 118-19 (2005).
51
See 21 U.S.C. §§846 and 963. “Any person who attempts or conspires to
commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
object of the attempt or conspiracy.” Id.
50
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must exist, the defendant must knowingly and voluntarily
participate in the conspiracy, and the there needs to be an overt act
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.52 However, many
statutes, both federal and state, and the common law omit the overt
act requirement.53 The first element is usually considered the
plurality requirement and the third element, the overt act
requirement. It is this third requirement that distinguishes the
crime of conspiracy from the mere discussion of a crime under
federal law. It is taking the thoughts and putting them into action.
That simple act condemns the whole group, even if others in the
conspiracy do nothing. To avoid liability, a conspirator must take
active steps to get out of the conspiracy, but that may not be
enough. If the group succeeds in committing the object crime,
they can still be charged with conspiracy as a substantive crime in
addition to being charged with the object crime.54 Thus,
conspiracy does not combine with the object crime to create one
substantive crime, but remains its own crime.
As a mode of liability, conspiracy can be used to convict a
defendant for the substantive crimes of the defendant’s coconspirators. Shortly after the adoption of the Nuremberg Charter,
the U.S. Supreme Court incorporated conspiracy as a mode of
liability into federal criminal law. Pinkerton v. United States55
held that each conspirator is responsible for all reasonably
foreseeable crimes committed by the group in the furtherance of
the conspiracy. This form of responsibly is known as “Pinkerton
Liability.” Under Pinkerton liability, a large conspiracy with many
acts going on in different places can produce a large number of
crimes that an individual is liable for. Prosecutors in the U.S. use
conspiracy as a powerful weapon to leverage and convict
defendants in criminal organizations, providing many substantive
and procedural advantages.56 Pinkerton liability is very broad and
captures all the members of the conspiracy without differentiating
the level of participation in the furtherance of the plan. Pinkerton
liability is not a part of many U.S. state jurisdictions, the Model
Penal Code, and civil law jurisdictions.57 The third category of the
joint criminal enterprise doctrine is similar to this form of liability,
but a wholly separate mode of liability.58 The doctrine of joint
52

United States v. Cure, 804 F.2d 625, 628 (11th Cir. 1986).
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§846 and 963
54
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975).
55
328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
56
See LUBAN, ET AL. supra note 27, at 519 for a list of advantages conspiracy
provides for federal prosecutors in the U.S.
57
LUBAN, ET AL. supra note 27, at 880.
58
See Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 7 (“[T]he international doctrine of ‘joint
criminal enterprise,’ [. . .] has nothing to do with crime of conspiratorial
agreement.”).
53
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criminal enterprise is different from Pinkerton liability in that it
does not impose automatically, and generally apply, liability to all
members of the group.59 It requires a case-by-case analysis of the
participation of each member of the group.60
The civil law tradition, especially in continental Europe,
does not include the substantive crime of conspiracy. An
illustrative example of a civil law approach is the 1930 Italian
Penal Code that states, “So far as the law does not provide to the
contrary, if two or more persons agree to commit a criminal act
and the act is not committed, no one may be punished for the
simple fact of the agreement.”61 The Musema court claimed to
have found a comparable concept to conspiracy called complot in
the civil law tradition; however, this claim seems dubious.62 It is
well settled that civil law systems do not favor an inchoate crimes
like the Anglo-American style conspiracy doctrine.
d. Judicial Decisions
Judicial decisions can also be a source for international law,
although they are somewhat secondary to both custom and treaty
law. For instance, the Statute for the International Court of Justice
states that the Court’s decisions do not have precedential effect.63
Judicial law at the international level most closely reflects a civil
law tradition, rather than a common law tradition with precedent.
International courts and tribunals have limited jurisdiction as
defined in their founding charters or statutes. They are generally
considered to be lacking the power to create new law to fill gaps in
international law—although using the various sources of
international law creatively would allow a court to deal with
ambiguities. Only the most relevant international court decisions
pertaining to the law of criminal conspiracy are presented here.
i. International Military Tribunals
In United States v. Goering the defendants were charged
with “Crimes against Peace by the planning, preparation, initiation
and waging of wars of aggression” and “War Crimes” and “Crimes
against Humanity,” as well as “participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit all these

59

Id. at 21-22.
Id.
61
Italian Penal Code § 115 (1930).
62
See infra Part V.
63
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 59 (1946).
60
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crimes.”64 The court’s analysis contains references to both
“conspiracy” and “common plan” to commit war crimes. The
evidence presented by the prosecution was offered to support the
charges of both conspiring and the common plan, as well as the
charges of planning and waging war.65 The scope of the
conspiracy in this case spanned twenty-five years, beginning with
the formation of the Nazis party—creating a huge class of possible
defendants.66 The court quotes the prosecution that states “any
significant participation in the affairs of the Nazi Party or
Government is evidence of a participation in a conspiracy that is in
itself criminal.”67 It uses this expansive definition of the
conspiracy to levy liability on a wide group of individuals and to
deal with the problem of organizational responsibility.68
Nonetheless, the court notes that the only substantive crime of
conspiracy is that related to the crime of aggressive war.69 Here,
the defendants were charged with the crime of conspiracy even
though the substantive crime, i.e. aggression, had occurred. This
trial was not a case of a failed attempt at starting an illegal war
where conspiracy stood alone.
The substantive law of Nuremberg was not considered
genuine international crimes until 1950 when the U.N. General
Assembly declared them to be universal principles of international
law.70 The only mention of conspiracy in the 1950 U.N.
Nuremberg principles is the mention in relation to “crimes against
peace:”
(a)

Crimes against peace:
(i)
Planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of
aggression or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or
assurances;
(ii)
Participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the acts
mentioned under (i).71
64

United States v. Goering (Sept. 30 1946) IMT, § 411 available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/09-30-46.asp.
65
Id. at § 466.
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Id.
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Id.
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DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 366 (1994).
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Here the mention of conspiracy is probably as a mode of
liability to the crime of aggression, not as a substantive crime on
its own. No mention of conspiracy is found under later subsections
outlining war crimes or crimes against humanity.
The form of liability that has arisen out of the IMT refers to
the collective planning, preparing, initiating, and waging of
aggressive war.72 George Fletcher analyzes the inclusion of
conspiracy in the IMT as it applies to the crime of aggression as
not adding anything to the substance of the crime.73 He states that
the crime of aggression is inherently a crime of collective action—
an inherent conspiracy.74 Conspiracy is not doing any of the work
in the description and it is a redundant charge. Therefore, the
substantive crime of conspiracy to commit a crime of aggression is
only criminalized if the crime of aggression does not happen.
Once the plan comes to fruition the crime of aggression absorbs
the crime of conspiracy.75
In the Tokyo Tribunal, the court found one defendant,
foreign minister Shigemitsu, guilty of the crime of aggression, but
acquitting him of conspiracy.76 In another case, the tribunal found
defendant ambassador Shiratori guilty of conspiracy and acquitted
him of the crime of aggression.77 The convictions were also tried
in the context of a successful commencement of a war of
aggression.
ii. Ad Hoc Tribunals
As described above in Part II, the ICTR in the Muesma and
Nahimana and others cases have addressed the issue of criminal
conspiracy as it pertains to the crime of genocide.78 Another ICTR
case where the concept of conspiracy was employed in the
Kambanda case, where the same trial chamber as the one that
heard the Musema case held that the defendant was guilty, after
temporarily pleading guilty, of both genocide and conspiracy to
commit genocide.79 Jean Kambanda was the interim Prime
Minister of Rwanda, and was accused of distributing weapons with
the knowledge that they would be used in genocide. A similar
result was reached in the Niyitegeka case where the defendant,

72

Fletcher Brief supra note 5, at 8.
Id. at 14.
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Minister of Information in the Interim Government and participant
in attacks on Tutsi refugees, was found guilty of both crimes.80
The ICTY has and is currently trying defendants for
conspiracy to commit genocide. For instance Zdravko Tolimir,
Assistant Commander for Intelligence and Security of the Bosnian
Serb Army, is currently being tried for inter alia genocide and
conspiracy to commit genocide for events that took place in
Srebrenica.81 In addition, the trial chamber in Prosecutor v.
Popović et al. is expected to render judgment on June 10, 2010,
where four defendants are charged with inter alia genocide and
conspiracy to commit genocide.82 The charges allege that the men
entered an agreement with others with the intent to kill and cause
physical and mental harm to Muslims in Srebrenica, with the
purpose to destroy, in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group, as such.83 The plan came to fruition in the Srebrenica
Massacre which did actually take place in July 1995, resulting in
thousands of deaths and the displacement of thousands refugees.84
The court’s analysis of the conspiracy charge will provide useful
insight into its status in international criminal law.
Conspiracy has most often been used in the ad hoc
tribunals as part of the conceptual development of a mode of
liability in international criminal law. The Anglo-American
concepts of conspiracy have been incorporated into the ICTY and
ICTR and have been blended with the civilian doctrines of
accomplice liability to create the doctrine of joint criminal
enterprise.85 The ICTY has discussed conspiracy as a mode of
liability in comparison to joint criminal liability, for example in the
Milutinović case where Dragoljub Ojdanić challenged the court’s
jurisdiction. The ICTY emphasizes that the two modes of liability
are very different, stating: “while mere agreement is sufficient in
the case of conspiracy, the liability of a member of a joint criminal
enterprise will depend on the commission of criminal acts in
furtherance of that enterprise.”86 Ojdanić was charged both as a
superior87 and for planning, instigating, ordering, committing and
otherwise aiding and abetting in the planning, preparation or
80
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execution of those crimes.88 Most of the ICTY cases address
conspiracy as a mode of liability. The pending cases described
above should be enlightening as to how this court treats conspiracy
as a substantive crime.
iii. Juridic Writings
As a side note to the actual law described above, certain
writings and draft laws may be helpful in interpreting the current
state of international criminal law. The International Law
Commission is charged with the “promotion of the progressive
development of international law and its codification.”89 The
United Nations General Assembly established the Commission in
1948. The Commission has created a number of treaty regimes,
including the Vienna Conventions, as well as creating the Rome
Statute establishing the ICC. Article 2 of the International Law
Commission’s Draft Code of Crimes states: “An individual shall
be responsible for a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 if that
individual: [. . .] [d]irectly participates in planning or conspiring to
commit such a crime which in fact occurs.”90 In this formulation,
conspiracy is only punishable if the object crime “in fact occurs.”
This would preclude conspiracy from being an inchoate crime that
can stand alone; however, it seems to comport with the practice of
past international courts.
V. ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION
The use of conspiracy as an inchoate crime has varied over
the decades and in the variously constituted courts; however, any
use in international criminal law was likely impermissible and was
a misapplication of the concept. Through surveying the various
sources of the inchoate crime of conspiracy, it is clear that the
theory is convoluted and there is much ambiguity as to its status.
One main source of confusion is the conflation of conspiracy as a
substantive crime and conspiracy as a mode of liability. As stated
earlier, conspiracy as a mode of liability is most likely a part of
criminal law. In those cases, the object crime must have been
committed for liability to flow to the defendant. Nonetheless, a
substantive crime of conspiracy most likely is not a part of
international criminal law, or to the extent it is used by
international tribunals, it is a misapplied and the tribunals are
88
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acting ultra vires. Some commentators seem to think that the
principles of conspiracy law are not existent in international law
altogether.91 The disconnect between decisions in the ICTR and
the Rome Statute omitting conspiracy from it’s jurisdiction,
suggest that this problem had not been resolved and may persist
into the future.
Examining the possible sources of a substantive crime of
conspiracy produces various rationales for why there is no
substantive crime of conspiracy in international criminal law. The
first being the scarceness of the concept in international treaty law
and in the statutes establishing the international courts and
tribunals.
Although many of the statutes establishing the
international tribunals provide for a crime of conspiracy as related
to a particularly heinous object crime, e.g. genocide and
aggression, these principles are not given any substance by the
statutes and the charge is rarely levied in cases where the object
crime did not occur. In addition, the trend seems to be to move
away from having a substantive crime of conspiracy in the statutes
as is the case with the Rome Statute. Further, the crime of
conspiracy is not likely a part of customary law because of the
inconsistency of practice given the divergent positions of the civil
and common law legal systems. Applying a principle that is
rejected by most legal systems around the world seems to be unfair
and violate the principle of non crimen sine lege.
The IMT seems to be the most prominent source for finding
conspiracy in international law. However, as pointed out by
commentators, the London Agreement of 1945 was created after
the crimes had been committed.92 Thus any conviction of a
conspiracy was used in the context of completed substantive
crimes. No defendant in the Nuremberg IMT was convicted of
conspiracy as a sole substantive crime.93 This is a common trend
in international criminal law. The use of conspiracy at Nuremberg
was more for “shock value and [a] moral message.”94
The Tokyo Tribunals and the ICTR seem to be the only to
courts to recognize the conspiracy as a substantive offense that can
stand alone from the object crime. Although the Genocide
Convention provides for a substantive crime of conspiracy, and the
main tribunals have jurisdiction to try this crime, actually applying
the principle may be a mistake. The content and substance of the
crime is unclear and requires the courts to reach beyond
established international law to attempt to deal with the foreign
concept. In particular, the ICTR case law poses a number of
91
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problems in applying the principle of conspiracy as a substantive
crime.
In the midst of trying to determine the content of the crime
of conspiracy the court engaged in questionable reasoning. First,
the Musema court also strangely said it would adopt “the definition
of conspiracy most favorable to Musema.”95 Why would a court
do this? What principle of law were they applying here? This
seems arbitrary and has no clear basis in settled international law.
In doing so, the Musema trial chamber conflated different concepts
from common and civil law traditions. It purported to find
common law concepts of conspiracy within the civil law
tradition.96 It claimed that the concept of complot as it exists in the
civil law tradition is similar to the common law concept of
conspiracy.97 Complot is punishable with regard to extremely
serious crimes like threatening state security.98
The court
presumably only seemed to be citing to French law.99
Commentators of the court criticize its lack of citations to sources
of the civil law concepts that it uses.100 In addition the court has
not been consistent in applying the principle. There is a conflict
between the Musema court stating that an individual cannot be
convicted of both conspiracy to commit genocide and genocide,
and the Kambanda court that found a defendant guilty of both
conspiracy and the object crime. This disconnect highlights the
haphazard nature of the ICTR’s rulings.
The ICTY so far has resorted to the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise not an American style conspiracy charge in its
cases; however, it will be interesting to see how the ICTY deals
with the conspiracy charges in its pending cases. The doctrine of
joint criminal enterprise seems better equipped to be employed by
international courts and tribunals to extend liability. The doctrine
incorporated elements of conspiracy into its definition.
Involvement in a “common plan” under the doctrine of joint
criminal enterprise is much broader than the mode of liability of
conspiracy.
The United States Supreme Court has weighed in on
whether there is an international substantive crime of conspiracy,
particularly looking to the laws of war. The laws of war are the
precursors to international criminal law and it is pertinent to
discover whether the foundational principles of international
criminal law contain such a substantive crime. In an amicus curiae
95
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brief filed in the Hamdan v. Rumsfeld101 case, George Fletcher
argued that the laws of war do not include the substantive crime of
conspiracy.102 In that case, the defendant Hamdan was charged
with conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism in a military
commission. The commissions only have jurisdiction under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for offences established
by statute or by the law of war.103 Since Congress had not granted
military commission to try cases of conspiracy, the only head of
jurisdiction available to the commissions would be the laws of war.
Fletcher then goes through the development of the laws of war
since the IMT and comes to the conclusion that the substantive
crime of conspiracy is not a part of it. Fletcher claims that the
substantive crime of conspiracy is neither found in international
customary law or in treaty law governing the laws of war,
especially pointing to the Geneva and Hague Conventions.104
Justice Stevens writing for a plurality agrees with Fletcher and
finds, through statute and common law, that conspiracy is not apart
of the law of war, and thus the military commissions do not have
jurisdiction to try Hamdan.105 Nevertheless, the outcome of the
case did not turn on this fact because Justice Kennedy did not join
this part of Stevens’s opinion, which made it a plurality.106 George
Fletcher describes the references to conspiracy in the Genocide
Convention and the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR as “the
afterglow of a dying concept.”107
The divergence in the approaches of the common law and
the civil law systems creates a major problem in adopting
conspiracy as a substantive crime, regardless of whether the
contours of the crime are clearly defined. It is true that in most
common law legal systems, the substantive crime of conspiracy
exists; therefore, a group of individuals is guilty of a substantive
offense as soon as they agree to commit a criminal act.108
However, George Fletcher puts it simply, “[C]onspiracy is foreign
to every legal system outside the English-speaking world.”109
Civil law countries use other legal devices to accomplish the same
goals as the common law states do with the concept of
conspiracy.110 Civil law, or civil law-like, countries constitute a
101
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substantial part of the world’s legal systems. Most of South
America, Africa, Asia, and almost all of Europe have civil law
systems, including Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Germany.
The common law is primarily limited to English-speaking
world.111 This disparity should counsel against the adoption of a
minority principle into international criminal law.
VI. CONCLUSION
After examining the jumble of sources for the concept of
the substantive crime of conspiracy in international law, we have
seen that the overlapping and sometimes contradictory norms
create great confusion that is often exacerbated by the international
courts and tribunals. Because it has been demonstrated that the
existence of a substantive crime of conspiracy in international
criminal law is dubious, and most likely wrong, courts should not
employ it in their reasoning. This area is continuing to develop
and the move taken by in the Rome Statute of removing the crime
of conspiracy from its jurisdiction is a step in the right direction.
International criminal law should best comport with the legal
concepts that a majority of the world would expect to be bound
under to remain a legitimate legal system.
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